Beyond the Illusion of Human Rights by Kunstler, Baron
Journal of Pedagogy, Pluralism, and Practice
Volume 1 | Issue 4 Article 5
Fall 1999
Beyond the Illusion of Human Rights
Baron Kunstler
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lesley.edu/jppp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Lesley. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Pedagogy,
Pluralism, and Practice by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@Lesley. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lesley.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kunstler, Baron (1999) "Beyond the Illusion of Human Rights," Journal of Pedagogy, Pluralism, and Practice: Vol. 1 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lesley.edu/jppp/vol1/iss4/5






The idea that natural, innately held universal human rights are the basis for human dignity 
and justice is so deeply flawed that the idea of rights may be obsolete as a means of 
resolving social disputes, regulating human behavior, or achieving the ends of social justice 
that rights were originally conceived to fulfill. To use rights as a reference frame for 
attempts to overcome oppression or extend justice overburdens a concept that does not have 
sufficient intrinsic authority to achieve these ends, and restricts our ability to draw upon 
alternative solutions to timeless problems. 
The future is a screen upon which we project our hopes for liberation from the terrors of the 
past. The notion of human rights has, for the past two centuries, fulfilled this very same role: 
America as the longed for destination of the downtrodden; the promise of freedom, elections, 
democracy in every country throughout the world; the dream of liberation have replaced 
paradise and hyssop as balms for the human spirit. Rights seem palpable: they can be 
guaranteed, we can almost taste them. Rights, whether we hold them or only hope to one day 
possess them, guarantee our future. Rights, however, are as elusive as the future, and perhaps 
illusive as well. As social and ecological crises intensify, we must free ourselves of the 
delusion of rights before we can free ourselves of the delusions of the future. 
In an attempt to do so, we shall examine the notion of rights and the alternative system from 
which it emerged, and finally offer an alternative suitable to the present age. 
The belief in universal human rights as it crystallized in the 18th century is the central engine 
of modern legal, moral, and relational frameworks. It undergirds the social contract between 
citizen and society, and governs the parameters of legal protection and political participation. 
It profoundly affects our values. Outrage at poverty and oppression, the hopes of the 
oppressed, our belief that to expect justice in the world is rational, all rest on a deeply felt 
sense that all human beings have the right to live free of threats to body and property, and to 
participate fully in the social process. Psychologically, we tend to feel valued in a society 
that protects us and allows us full latitude of expression, while our self-worth suffers under a 
regime that sanctions our abuse or forbids us behavior allowed to others. The extent to which 
we are endowed with rights matches the degree to which society views us as human, while 
the extent to which we are deprived of rights defines the level of dehumanization to which 
we are subject. 
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Thus, violation of rights is not just an assault on a specific option (free speech or the right to 
vote), but strikes at the very identity and thus stability of self and society. If, as Paolo Freire 
states, citing Hegel, that "what characterizes the oppressed is their subordination to the 
consciousness of the master", then deprivation of rights is clearly a profoundly psychological 
as well as political act. Any society that allows or encourages the violation of rights is 
already, whether it recognizes it or not, in a state of violent disintegration. A society that 
does not actively maintain and extend the umbrella of rights, finds its freedoms eroded and 
itself liable to corruption and decay. 
The identity, laws, and values of the United States, in particular, are founded upon the idea 
of natural, inalienable rights. Yet, despite an intensified concern for human rights today and 
many successful human rights initiatives, the idea of rights has been degraded as rights are 
increasingly used to advance an endless set of agendas. Some of these agendas are indeed 
just, but using rights as the focal point of discourse burdens the idea with a weight it never 
was meant to bear. 
Today, intellectual property rights are extended to portions of the genetic code used in 
bioengineered products. The right to bear arms is taken to include the right to use protective 
vest- piercing teflon bullets. The conflict between the right to choose an abortion versus the 
right to life of the foetus marks a major social divide. Creationists claim the right to have 
their beliefs taught as the equal of scientific theories. Mining and timber interests claim that 
U.S. laws regulating their activities undermine their rights as distinct cultures (i.e., the 
"mining culture") . Accused rapists' lawyers, to protect their clients' rights, can examine a 
victim's psychological records, and in court twist the most personal revelations of fantasy life 
or the most painful life episodes into an alleged flaw in the victim that somehow prompted 
the attack. Advertisers of myriad products proclaim everyone's right to be stylish in their 
own way, while real estate developers may sue environmentalist opponents for depriving 
them of earning a living. At the same time, crime and violence convince entire societies that 
members' basic rights to life and property are more insecure than ever. 
The notion of rights simply has no relevance to many of these positions, and is inadequate 
to help contending groups resolve their disagreements. The idea of rights is so misplaced 
and diluted in the contexts in which it is being used, that once a claim is put forth as a right, 
discussion becomes futile, for "rights" is simply the wrong frame for the argument. 
Circle of Familiars 
Rights in archaic societies (or those that retain their archaic legacies) differ from our own, in 
that they have no notion of rights apart from that bestowed by full participation in 
community life. The collective is primary. As A.W.H. Adkins states of ancient Greece, 
before the city state era, "human beings ha[d] no rights qua human beings". Protection and 
participation derived from a person's position within a group whose members had mutual 
interests, a relationship denoted by the term philotes, "a circle of people with cooperative 
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relationships". 
In fact, human beings are creatures of society from before the very beginning, as can be 
observed in the behavior of primates, wolves, elephants, and other social mammals. 
Ethologists such as Frans de Waal have observed animal characteristics formerly thought to 
be solely human: intense competition for hierarchy and status; behaviors that precisely 
express and reinforce an individual's place within the group; supportive, nurturing, and 
protective behavior other than parent/child relationships; interwoven alliances with apparent 
emotional bonds; communication of feelings of pleasure, displeasure, and belonging; 
ritualistic behaviors incorporating violence, dance, sexuality, and intoxication; and so on. 
One can hardly refrain from recognizing here aspects of individualized behavior, whether we 
choose to call it proto-human or not. 
Always, however, among social animals, group life is primary. The differentiation of social 
roles that defines individuality is largely adaptive, aimed at regulating violent tendencies and 
sexual competition, and enhancing the efficiencies of survival. As Dudley Young shows, 
another element asserts itself: an irrational, intoxicating, celebratory aspect of character 
enacted by chimps, for example, in their evening drumming, their response to thunderstorms 
(Young 120 ff.), or the eating of the brain of the colobus monkeys that they hunt (Young, 
66). Ritual, feelings of sympathy, hierarchy, intoxication, violence, identity: even in animal 
bands, the rudiments are there. Group behavior already arises out of the structure of social 
roles. Thus, both roles and the behavior that defines them establish the extent to which the 
group protects individuals and allows them to participate in its activities. In short, even 
among animals, we can discern a primeval version of rights. a primeval version of rights. 
The individuality of an animal can be described with reference to its position vis `a vis the 
"rights" accorded it by the group. 
Thus, by the time humans emerged as a species, we had a long history of performing the 
behaviors that define selfhood and the self's place in a group. In many such behaviors - 
dance, cannibalism, signals of submissions and dominance - we see the early makings of 
human ritual, but it is not yet ritual. Rather, an act becomes sacred and ritualized because 
through that act we express the essence of individuality. The very act that distinguishes one 
from the collective - or, conversely, that allows the collective to experience the power and 
synergy of its own unity, itself as one - becomes at once both a sign advertising its own 
identity and a monument to that identity, thus permantizing it (neatly expressed by the dual 
meanings of the ancient Greek word sema, "sign" and "burial mound"). Establishing such a 
sign binds both psychological and social energies, and forms the core cathexis from which 
identity develops. Thus myth and identity are self-reflexive: they arise when consciousness 
turns back on itself to wonder at its own birth and its meaning; with this, comes the longing 
to secure the eternality of the identity that is embodied by the narrative content and structure 
of the myth. 
Rights, then, have an inherent sacred aspect because they emerge in the same breath, so to 
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speak, as selfhood and identity. Identity is carved out of the collective mentality to the 
extent that individuals have rights. Yet neither rights nor identity are ever secure, for both 
exist by a kind of metaphysical sleight-of-hand. On the one hand, rights represent the 
foundation of one's role and belonging in the group. But one's role is always subject to 
challenge, hence, rights are negotiated with every bristle of a cohort's fur, with every 
physical threat. Because rights come into being as a consequence of the emergence of an 
individual self, and because they depend on the same act of self-conscious awareness that 
secures the self, every negotiation of rights is also a negotiation upon which the continued 
integrity of the self depends. Rights must uphold the integrity of self, but rights have no 
essential existence apart from the self that rights must uphold. As notions of self are 
elaborated, the idea of rights develops as well. This leads to a certain contradiction at the 
heart of the whole enterprise: rights are the "greenhouse" that nurture the development of 
individual self and identity. Meanwhile, rights themselves only make sense as projections of 
individuality. 
The evolution of animal behavior towards human legal and political forms is evidenced in 
rituals of apportioning food that have been observed among many mammals. While female 
lions kill the prey, male lions get first go at it, devouring the delicacies and choice cuts. 
Wolves take turns at the feast according to status. Similarly, apportionment of slabs of meat 
among human hunters, or booty among warriors, is an early means of defining social status 
and rights (Kunstler, 1991). Among warrior societies, cannibalism and ingestion of 
psychotropic plants were marked by ritualized carving or division of the victim or plant, 
from which the sacred role of the steward in ancient societies derives, and Louis Gernet 
(1968, 1981) and Gregory Nagy (1979) have demonstrated the link between the distribution 
of the sacrifice and proto-legal ideas of justice. 
Farther along, in ancient Greece, the foundation of new city states was formalized by 
apportioning land among the new citizens, and sharing food at the common table was an 
early guarantor, and symbol of, citizenship in the polis (Kunstler, 1991, Vernant, 1982), a 
precise parallel to the more primitive division of booty among warriors. Indeed, the Iliad 
begins with a conflict over one such division of booty, a conflict that inspires the "wrath" of 
Achilles, the first word and thematic note of the epic. In Homer, too, a formulaic phrase 
denotes the equal division of meat at the heroes' feast (Iliad 1.468, 1.602, 2.431, 7.320, 
23.56). One hears echoes far more ancient than Homer in such passages. 
In many myths, the bodies or substance of deities are divided and shared by celebrants, an 
act that often bestows identity upon a community and is linked with its discovery of a food 
source, i.e., a herd or agricultural crop. The inverse of such acts is the sacrifice or offering, in 
which the god receives portions of the slaughtered beast or the first fruits. Actually, all such 
acts of division and ingestion are close in meaning: the division of meat at the feast, the 
apportionment of land at the initiation of a colony, and the rewarding of rights are, in fact, 
the division of the god itself. Eating the gods distributes their power throughout the social 
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body and binds the community of sharers. Land, food, rights - these are all emanations of the 
magical substance of the deity whose division establishes a social compact and a compact 
with the natural sources of fertility. 
Societies tend to become more stratified as wealth increases, and rituals grounded in ancient 
usage yield to formally defined legal relationships that precisely describe the claims of 
individuals to the materia of society. The more complex the society and the more wealth 
involved, the more painstaking the legal categories. Greek law evolves as the clan's claims to 
the deceased's property yields to the legal claims of an individual's linear descendants 
(Willets, 1967). The legal accounting of estates in anticipation of inheritance led to a more 
precise definition of rights and prerogatives in political society even as it was fueled by - and 
favored - the emergence of individual claimants over the groups that formerly stood as heirs. 
At the city-state level, citizenship comes to replace the idea of philotes as the organizing 
principle of the larger community, but it is also exclusive and does not erase the strong 
feelings of membership in the philotes circle. One possesses rights only as a function of 
social responsibility, of one's contribution to the well-being of the community, and one's 
identity derives strictly from the polis and one's family. In most Greek poleis, only citizens 
able to afford the hoplite armor required to fight and protect the city and its citizens, had full 
participative rights. In the more democratic cities, rights under law were broadest. No one, 
however, would claim rights within their community by reference to innate, inalienable 
human rights: such a concept was meaningless to a philotes-oriented culture. The magic 
circle of socially bonded individuals is the basis for defining rights; abstract notions of 
innate human rights do not exist. 
The shadow side of the circle of familiars is the fact that those outside the circle are nothing 
to those within it; they may be totally objectified. The horrors of genocide, the atrocities of 
torture prevalent in over 100 nations today, or the murderous ethnic cleansing witnessed in 
Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo are grounded in the tensions between loyalty to the closed 
circle of familiars and the aggression endemic to human nature, whether one views this 
aggression as based in the animal or the social self. But even in times of peace, elaborate 
ceremonies of gift- giving are required to elevate one's status from outsider (i.e., nothing), to 
insider or ally. 
Greek myth offers countless examples of such bonds established between members of 
different circles, which came under the xenos code of behavior. xenos refers to the stranger, 
the stranger's host (if one exists), and the code that binds them. When one travels beyond 
one's circle of philotes, one becomes xenos, a person with no rights except those defended by 
physical prowess. A native of another community, however, can extend to the xenos the 
status of guest and draw him into a local protective circle of philotes. The process also 
served to join two circles of familiars, and was the basis of marriage arrangements between 
phratries. The code muted aggression and mistrust and allowed closed groups to establish 
alliances with one another. It also modeled how rights were bestowed in all philotes-based 
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groups: via ceremonial exchange of vows and gifts. 
Cult of the Object 
Greek city states defined rights via laws covering criminal acts, due legal process, 
inheritance, and distinct levels of political participation based on property. As commerce 
expanded, limited rights were extended to metics, members of other communities who lived 
and conducted their business abroad. Thus, in a complex mercantile environment, the 
primitive xenos code became the basis for laws that defined the protections, obligations, and 
behavioral latitude of strangers living among the natives. Rome, of course, bestowed citizen 
rights to all qualified members of its vast empire, a way of extending the social obligation 
and responsibility that bound the empire together. The integrity of community, not 
individual, was still paramount. 
The rights belonging to members of any given group ebb and flow with the economic and 
political power of that group and its ability to compel compliance to its vision. In general, 
rights travel from the more propertied classes on down, each new claimant group inspired by 
the (often unwitting) example of previous ones. As medieval Europe developed politically, 
economically, and technologically, the bourgeoise claimed its freedom from caste, nobility, 
church, and even guild. The growth of urban society, fueled by mercantile activity, created 
the social and psychic space for an expanded notion of individuality to flourish, a trend 
evident in the arts. During the Renaissance, as John Berger (1973, 1981) notes, the lush 
qualities of oil painting reflected the desire of the nouveaux riches to celebrate their own 
substance, perhaps substance itself. 
"Oil painting did to appearances what capital did to social relations. It turned everything into 
an object. Everything became exchangeable because everything became a commodity" 
(Berger, 87). In such paintings, the rich textures of clothing and drapes, the reflection and 
sparkle on the polished surface of fine furniture, the candy-like quality of the jewels, all 
reveal that however religious a painting's subject, the true subject was corporeal. The oil 
painters of the Renaissance celebrated the self as substance. They also celebrated the 
creation of a universe of perception, value, and values residing in the realm of art and object 
that was an alternative to the religious world view of the Middle Ages. The opening of 
pictorial space, evident in painting in a steady progression from the 13th century throughout 
the Renaissance (and, arguably, up to the present day), represents both the opening of the 
internal self to its own possibilities for growth outside the boundaries of birth and belief. 
The aestheticized object is beautiful not just because of the craft or art that goes into its 
creation, but because it is an extension of a newly conceived concept of self, an extension of 
the myth that self composes about both itself and the myth of itself (i.e., that the myth is 
sacred, true, etc.). The modern object, that is, the object from the Renaissance on, is 
important precisely because it is not sacred, in the traditional sense. The realm of the sacred 
is highly efficient in its use of objects: it does not need many to function as symbols. 
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Royalty, for example, has its crown, throne, sceptre, and insignia. Yet, this selection of 
objects to receive the charge of symbolic meaning has generally occurred in a world 
relatively poor in human-made objects. (Contrast this refinement of symbology with more 
archaic notions of the sacred, such as those that hold every tree or animal to partake of 
holiness). Whatever the relative wealth of a king in, say, 1250 A.D., it was as nothing 
compared to the wealth unleashed by capitalism from its early stages on. The modern object, 
liberated from the constraints of the archaic economy, goes forth and multiplies. The deity of 
the modern age mirrors, structurally, the logic of economic forces and the machinery that 
serves them. The god of this new system, like all gods, is carved up and its substance 
distributed throughout the world, in this case into every object of beauty or wealth upon 
which an individual might stamp her or his ownership. 
The proliferation of objects and the ballooning spatial framework available to increasing 
numbers of people created the ability to distinguish oneself from others, and the choices 
subsequent to this ability. The self was refined and cultivated by exposure to the wondrous 
new dimensions of the objective. The cult of possession was inevitably turned on the self: 
one's self, or the true self of another (as in love), becomes one's most treasured possession, 
and begins to displace God as the object of civilization's devotion. As the self becomes 
exalted, so too must the notion of rights that protect the self and that guarantee its ability to 
experience all the marvelous possibilities the brave new world offers. Out of this came a 
sentimentality of self that encouraged the development of romantic love and, eventually, the 
Rousseauvian view of Nature and childhood. 
The revolution of rights in 18th century Europe and America is unthinkable without this long 
cultural preparation. Such thinkers as Rousseau, Thomas Paine, and Locke advanced the idea 
of universal rights that attach to human beings by virtue of their being human. Thomas 
Jefferson, the contradictions of his personal life and exclusivity aside, majestically evoked 
this belief in paragraph two of the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator, with 
certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. 
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed". It is noteworthy that Jefferson, in his own draft, 
referred to the "self-evident truths" as "sacred and undeniable". As Edwin S. Gaustad writes, 
they "required no argumentation, no Aristotelian syllogism, no Platonic presupposition, no 
authority whatever except Reason to establish their validity." 
That all "Men", by virtue of their creation and in line with the intent and will of the Creator, 
possess rights, reverses the most ancient sense of rights, and overthrows the general 
insulated tendency of the philotes system in favor of an all-inclusive, universal formula. One 
no longer has rights by virtue of belonging to a circle of philotes. Rather, community or state 
must be reshaped to conform with the individual's possession, as individual, of divinely 
ordained rights. Rights are no longer carefully apportioned by formal ritual, law, or 
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traditional usage. They are now distributed throughout the entire world and attach to one at 
birth. To the Enlightenment minds that disdained the irrationalities of religion, the automatic 
dispensation of rights did away with any need for rites. And of course, if rights are 
automatically bestowed at birth, so too is identity, a notion that fit well with Rousseau's 
vision, and even Locke's tabula rasa, since an infant's mind begins growing at least from its 
earliest training. 
Thus, beyond the tensions inherent in any notion of rights are added others: rights no longer  
need to be earned, nor do they incur obligations equal to the status they confer upon a 
person. The job now is to protect one's rights (one's intrinsic wealth), rather than to earn 
them. And the idea that one exchanges rights contractually in order to strengthen social 
bonds has today become anathema to many; individual rights are no longer seen as part of 
any exchange mechanism, including gift exchange. Rights are viewed as so essential and 
innate they become indivisible; hence, they inspire a strong tendency towards isolation and 
lend support to arguments that societies comprise discrete entities and have no innate 
unifying force. 
The extensive claim to rights that culminated in the Enlightenment is inseparable from the 
cult of the object that developed hand-in-hand with the market economy. Rights are viewed 
as possessions precisely because they evolved in harness with the cult of the object and the 
principle of possession. Rights become the ultimate commodity even as they are enshrined 
as our most valuable possession. Their possession represents the gateway to possibilities as 
vast as the manufacturing and market system of the burgeoning Industrial Revolution and as 
broad as the scope of economic and psychological terrains pursued by colonizers across the 
globe. As Harold J. Laski points out: "By 1600Émen are living and working in a new moral 
worldÉwhat  permeates them [its sources] all is the sense of a new wealth at hand for the 
seekingÉThe passion for novelty is intense." (Laski, p. 64). Laski points out that the new 
doctrine of non-governmental interference with business and trade "assume(s) that economic 
liberty is in the nature of thingsÉ" "Freedom" is just another word for the chance to pursue 
prosperity unfettered, and the traditional Christian deity is driven back from his governance 
of social and economic affairs into the realm of "private faith" (Laski, 100-101). Locke 
(Laski, 101) articulated the ethic that "The supreme power cannot take from any man any 
part of his property without his own consent." In other words, the new god is the god of 
property and it both drives the old god back into his cave and assumes the mantle of 
"national salvation" (Laski, 100) as its own. 
The revolutionaries of America and France took the next inevitable step: if a government is 
not created in harmony with the demands of individual rights, then citizens can seek redress 
to the point of overthrowing it. Individual rights have been given precedence over 
community cohesion and the need to uphold community obligations, although to the 18th 
century mind, responsibility to the community was a given. Nonetheless, the shift in 
perspective is crucial to the future degradation of the idea of rights. 
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With the concept of natural, or inalienable rights, a new pattern is set forth, radically 
visionary because it asks everyone to see in everyone else the potential for full actualization. 
The new ethic undermined traditional forms of oppression, and certainly inspired the fight 
against slavery and, eventually, the struggle for the liberation of women, colonized 
populations, and "minorities". All our attitudes have been profoundly shaped by this ethic, 
and it has inspired countless people in the daily struggle for freedom and dignity. 
Despite its triumphs, the principle of universal rights can also be viewed as a sentimental 
conceit verging on deceit, sentimental because it feeds on what we suppose it demands we 
feel rather than what we truly do feel. For our emotions cannot sustain the demands of a 
belief in all people as ends in themselves, especially in a globalized era in which the entire 
suffering population of the world is nightly marched into our living rooms via television. 
Our minds dutifully regard each new round of suffering as an outrage, but our feelings 
recoil or turn off. We know we must feel for the literally billions of people whose rights are 
being trampled, but we have nothing but the term "rights" to guide us in our feelings or 
response. No wonder the term has become meaningless. We watch sentimentalized movies 
of Gandhi or elevate Mother Theresa to the role of global saint because we must believe it 
possible to universalize compassion, and for some few, it may have been possible. But the 
gravitational pull of the philotes circle, indeed, of the multiple circles that claim us, is far 
too great and our core feelings cannot go where our minds might lead. 
Triumph of the Object 
The relationship of person to object is primary to economy and to law. In the market 
economy, a person "owns" an object, whether the object is money, a house, a slave, a radio, 
or a tin of sardines. "To own" means to absorb a thing into the sphere of psycho-social space 
that an individual has managed to claim as his or her own. People considered wealthy and 
powerful command greater regions of socially acknowledged identity than the poor and 
dispossessed. To take a possession from another is to pierce the boundaries of ownership, 
and law exists in large part to sustain the illusion of "own-ship", i.e., self-through-ownership. 
The corollary is that the law exists to protect the notion of ownership so that the most 
powerful are granted legitimacy in their pursuit of greater ownership. 
It has long been acknowledged in social formulae that the transference of ownership is 
intrinsically dangerous to the self. Rituals of exchange guarantee safety during the 
awkward liminal moment when goods are passed across boundaries. Any exchange can 
easily erupt into violence unless the most formal protocols are observed. Today's 
economy is no less free of threats: one might be "ripped off", "devoured by sharks", 
"beaten up" at meetings, and worse. 
Because ownership bestows de facto rights as well as rights by law, and one's social wealth 
quite palpably determines one's access to rights, the relationship of an individual to the 
objects and structure of exchange strongly influence the character of rights in society. The 
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market economy has achieved its pinnacle in this era of corporate capitalism: everything is 
an object, everything bought and sold, including air rights, the flow of electrons and 
information throughout the world, water rights, land rights, mineral rights, fishing rights, 
timber rights, the right to pollute, and the right to market parts of the genetic code or 
medicines derived from specific bodily parts. All that was once holy is now for sale and 
"human rights" converge with the notion of "rights to" the very substance of the world itself. 
The self, too, as we noted, is marketed as the ultimate product behind the pitch for most 
products: advertising sings the hymn of the Self-Adoring Self. But this is logical, 
considering that the identification of ownership with self has permeated every aspect of 
our relationship to objects. 
This is true as well of objects in the grammatical sense: the "I", the modern Self, stands as 
Subject over a vast kingdom of objects. At its moment of greatest power, of greatest 
ownership, the Self is actually at its most delusionary and fragile, at its vanishing point. 
Why? Because it is distributed throughout all its objects. The Subject is the apportioned God 
distributed among its objects, only the Subject actually worships itself through its objects. 
Eventually, it is divided into and invested in so many objects that it becomes fully 
objectified. The Subject that wanted so many things disappears piece by piece into the 
inanimate objects of its desire. Relations between Subjects are mediated through complex 
negotiations whose function is to regulate the transmission of self masquerading as 
ownership. Hence, connective bonds among people and groups becomes less and less 
important to the regulation of exchange. Abstract legal formulations come to define the 
algebra of contending claims typically advanced by discrete "selves-as-Subjects". Along 
with the wealth of objects there is also a wealth of objectified qualities such as freedom, 
right, beauty, etc. In an ironic twist, once the object has absorbed the sacredness of Self, the 
self becomes mere container, and the object appropriates the substance of the apportioned 
god. The object-world, in which the Self is wholly invested, becomes a new God, 
supplanting the Subject. The Self, fixed upon the object, loses its connection not only to 
deity, but to its own narcissism, and has been severed from the moorings that bound it to its 
own identity. 
The Gift 
In mythopoeic consciousness, the boundary between subject and object, and between a 
person and things, tends to be blurry. The two are often strongly identified with one 
another, an identification based on the mutual identification and obligation that charge 
through them. The reverence with which hand-crafted objects were handled; the sacred 
investiture of symbolic clothing, weapons, musical instruments, and jewelry; the 
numberless myths and fairy tales regarding birth tokens; the sacred shields and headdresses 
of warriors; the powerful taboos around food, blood, flesh, and hair; the magical regard in 
which early technical achievements were held: the list is endless. Person and object were 
traditionally united by a strongly felt mutual identification and ongoing exchange - even 
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circulation - of identity which bestowed a sacred identity upon each object. (This sacredness 
is not due to the role of the object as symbol; it is sacred in itself due to its sharing the 
numina of identity with the individual or community). 
This identity of self and object reflects the mutual identification between individual and 
community. The immense energy inherent in the organically forged bonds of the animal 
band was a tremenduum capable of extinguishing any individual who did not respect its 
power. Early notions of individuality were linked with ideas of apportionment and division: 
the deity is divided and eaten so that its pieces may be individualized. In effect the primal 
deity is both superego and id. The necessities and catastrophes governing organic life, and 
submission to the tremenduum, give form to the superego, while the rhythmic pulse of 
natural life asserts itself as id. In sharing a portion of the god with one's fellows, one gains a 
measure of individual sovereignty (by identifying it as oneself) over the tremenduum 
represented by the collective's energy. This sovereignty contains the seed of individual 
awareness and integrity, the ego. Any occasion in which boundaries are crossed - birth, 
death, puberty, marriage, conflict, friendship, travel, shamanic journey, exchange of objects - 
not only connects the partners in the crossing, but actually opens up the passageways to that 
powerful swarm of energy out of which both community and self have been scribed. 
The gift economy belongs to archaic cultures for whom objects and, more importantly, the 
circulation of objects, activates the energy of the tremenduum. It derives its framework from 
the impulses and behaviors of the philotes circle, but had been left behind by many societies 
that still retained the philotes as the basis of the social contract. The northwest American 
Indian custom of the potlach first drew special attention to the notion of a gift economy. 
Marcel Mauss (1950, 1990) explained how sumptuous gifts offered by one tribal phratry to 
another were "woven into an inextricable network of rites, of total legal and economic 
services, of assignment to political ranks in the society of men, in the tribe, and in the 
confederations of tribes, and even internationally" (Mauss, 6). He remarked on the hostility 
and competition for prestige that accompanied the potlach, and the fact that the potlach not 
only included giving away all a phratry's wealth, but might involve mass destruction of 
goods as well. 
In both highly formal and informal settings, the gift establishes a magical or religious bond 
between giver and receiver in which the latter incurs an obligation to give a gift in return, 
often one more "valuable" than the original. As Dudley Young observes of the xenos code, 
which belongs to the gift economy, "the offering of hospitality is no less than the bridge that 
enables man to move from a warring world into one of politics and other peaceful 
communications" (Young, 277). Anxiety underlies the gift, whether the seemingly senseless 
destruction of goods in the potlach, or the offering that marks a long-standing, affectionate 
alliance. Anxiety is alleviated by giving up what one has become overly attached to - but 
this only works for a society that has a clear sense of the alternative, the balanced state its 
sacrifice or gift seeks to achieve. 
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Every act of giving transforms the character of human interaction, shifts it from one laden 
with conflictual potential to one marked by affection (philotes) and collaboration. Yet, as 
Mauss indicates, the gift-giving transmits hostility as well. To offset this build-up of 
tension, the gift must keep circulating, and it is the circulation of wealth from one person 
to another, or among groups, that creates the web of relations and hence the value of the 
objects. Accumulation, production, and ownership for their own sake are not the 
objectives here. Indeed, to halt the circulation of gifts is to interrupt the flow of life force 
upon which the well-being of the community depends. Value intrinsic to the goods, 
anxiety over conflict, and resolution through alliance are fused in a continual dance that, 
while by no means utopian, offers an alternative to the systems of rights based on the 
philotes circle, on the one hand, and innate, natural rights on the other. 
Lewis Hyde (1979) suggests that creative activity, both in regard to the internal dynamics of 
the creator and the role of the artist in relation to her or his auditors, can only be sustained 
by the dynamics of the gift economy: "Éthe commerce of art draws each of its participants 
into a wider selfÉIn the realized gifts of the gifted we may taste that zoe-life which shall not 
perish even though each of us, and each generation, shall perish" (Hyde, 152). Hyde's 
insight applies as well to all gift-based economies: circulation of energy and wealth through 
gifts is linked to notions of group cohesion and immortality. The gift economy lies at the 
heart of the archaic community, and Hyde (88) notes the "struggle between legal contract 
and what might be called 'contracts of the heart'" when gift and market economies collide. 
Yet the gift and market economies stand in evolutionary relation to one another as well. 
The obligation incurred by the gift is identified by both Gernet and Mauss as a key feature 
in the early history of law. Indeed, in early law, as Mauss (49) states, "things themselves 
had a personality and an inherent power. Things are not the inert objects that the law of 
Justinian and our own legal systems conceive them to beÉ [In Roman law] they form part 
of the family." Mauss (48 ff.) and Hyde (86) both indicate that real law (regulating things) 
and personal law were not always discrete categories, but often were identical due to the 
mutual identification between law and object. 
The role of the object in the gift economy stands as far from the notion of commodity as an 
object of exchange or desire can be. The gift economy's subject/object distinction is erased 
by the close identification of gift with self. Because the gift perpetually moves between giver 
and recipient. The indirect object (recipient) in one exchange becomes the subject (giver) in 
the next. The gift, oddly enough, never actually serves as direct object because it always 
belongs to the essential nature of both the giver (subject) and recipient (indirect object). The 
dynamic tension of the scheme is inherent in the imbalance of a grammar that possesses 
subject and indirect object, but no direct object at all. And if the object is never direct object, 
and instead only partakes of the nature of those who keep it in motion, then in a sense it is 
simply not an object at all. This paradox further unsettles any pretense at the social order 
being founded on a stable platform; it reveals the profound instability at the heart of 
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economic exchange and law by revealing the syntactical absurdities at their core. 
Gift-giving is also associated with offerings to nature or the gods via sacrifice, pointing to 
another key notion of the gift economy: the vacuum that one creates by giving inevitably 
draws wealth back to oneself. This can only work when supported by a strong set of 
obligations that accompany the offering. The gift creates an obligation, which is the basis of 
contract law. The vacuum is creative, and out of it comes the necessity of contract as the 
basis of economy and law. As long as the object resists reification the system resists 
entropy; as the energy of the object is spent - in both senses - it is more likely to be 
possessed, and with possession comes weight, matter, gravity, and time. 
The rights established by exchange of gifts are conceived very differently from the innate 
rights we receive in a commodity-based economy. In the gift economy, rights can never be 
taken for granted and they come with strict obligations attached. Innate rights are prior to a 
social connection because the object has extended its dominion over consciousness, and the  
relationship of owner to object becomes the model for all other relationships. Hence, we own 
rights just as we own the things to which we have a right. As Paolo Freire (40) writes, "The 
earth, property, production, the creations of people, people themselves, time - everything is 
reduced to the status of objects at its ('the oppressor consciousness's') disposal." In the 
struggle over rights - in a world where rights are objects - those with most power over 
objects tend to win. And remembering that the philotes model of rights co-existed with a 
commodity-based economy for millenia, we can suggest that the closed philotes circle may 
well fall short of the dynamism inherent in an active gift economy. The gift economy is 
potentially an open, expansive system, and the role of the philotes in a gift economy, while 
crucial, is subtly different from the closed, cautious, and conservative philotes group that 
history shows us time and again. One area of investigation may be the effect early 
commodity-based economies had upon the character of the philotes. 
Beyond Objects and Rights 
The domain of the object may be eroding. In our current electronic, post-modern, post-
relativity era, the object has become, as Gilles Deleuze (1993) notes, an "objectile", suitable 
to an age "where fluctuation of the norm replaces the permanence of a law; where the object 
assumes a place in a continuum by variationÉThe new status of the object no longer refers 
its condition to a spatial moldÉbut to a temporal modulation that implies as much the 
beginnings of a continuous variation of matter as a continuous development of form" 
(Deleuze, 19). This has an impact on the notion of subject as well as object, for the subject 
becomes, in Whitehead's term, a "super- ject", that is, a viewer defined by its posssessing 
"the point of view" necessary to see the objectile as it travels along its path (Deleuze, 19-
20). This role ofobjectile is precisely that held by the object in the gift economy. The subject 
in the gift economy, defined only in relation to his or her gift, performed the role of super-
ject. 
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Deleuze's conceptual play reminds us that natural rights are at home in a Newtonian world of 
discrete objects in a logical clockwork universe. Newton's world is spatial, with well-defined 
relationships between subject and object, and object and object. In the post-Newtonian 
world, objects have no fixed relationship to us, nor do we have fixed relationships to 
anything beyond our point of view, beyond the objectiles streaking across the screen-of-
vision field. The notion is absurdist, yet suited to a world of global networks, cyber-realities, 
virtual organizations, non- goods-based economies, a universe of black holes and bent space, 
programmed uncertainty, and a quantum-based physical ground in which "nothingness" 
takes up the greater portion of the volume of the universe. As the corporate economy 
becomes ever more voracious, even the political entities that pretended to be guardians of 
our rights yield to conglomerates whose notion of rights is non-existent or irrelevant. We are 
beyond an obsession with ownership of objects, even beyond ownership of money. The goal 
now is to control the flow of symbols representing currency; currency and currents have 
become one. Like Deleuze's objectiles, we are streaking in a trajectory that arcs far beyond 
the conditions in which the Enlightenment notion of rights were formed or could be 
sustained. 
The problem of expenditure of surplus energy, which Georges Bataille (1991) calls "the 
accursed share", bears directly on the nature of the gift. The gift, the sacrifice, and even 
frenzies of self- destruction can be seen as adaptive mechanisms to regulate the build-up of 
surplus energy, which presents a tremendous, perhaps overwhelming, psycho-social 
challenge. The matrix defined by rights and identity is the ultimate "accursed share", for it 
represents the ultimate surplus of all: self-awareness, a setting apart of the individual from 
the universal or collective. 
In this era of voracious growth and proliferation of capital, the dilemma of surplus becomes 
life- threatening. One cannot produce without devouring, as contemporary ecocide attests. 
What Lorenz (1950, 1987) calls "the pleasure experienced through increase" depends for its 
sustenance, as Lorenz (139-140) points out, on the natural limits to organic growth. In 
contrast to organic forms, "a human enterprise . . . is potentially immortal; not only is no 
limit set to its growth, it is in fact that much less subject to disruption the larger it becomes" 
(Lorenz, 140). When the "accursed share" becomes the sole objective of the market system 
and its institutions, the goal, in fact, of each individual, a vital limit has been breached. It is 
precisely at this point that the self loses itself in the infinitude of "objective" reality. 
And while self-hood becomes our most precious commodity, as a commodity it is 
constantly being devoured. Even now, the value of our identities to marketers, information 
brokers, insurance companies, and biogenetic researchers, is increasing. But this is only the 
market economy's reflection of a more essential process. Natural rights presume an infinite 
self. Bataille's "accursed share" is now the greater part of production; our economy exists 
to produce and feed an infinite self, a self of infinite possibilities whose value is sustained 
by the notion of irreducible, hence infinite, rights. It is a triumph over death, of sorts, and 
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when death ends, so does life, for no new forms can come into being. The surplus 
overflows all natural bounds as well as our ability to dispose of it. Our efforts become more 
frantic, and our systems move towards overload. 
Rights, like Lewis Hyde's notion of creativity, require some measure of a gift economy; they 
are the most profound of gifts, so primeval as to pre-date the human. They are coeval with 
the gift of identity and individuality, the gift offered in rites of passage, which are marked by 
the bestowal of keepsake gifts by the initiators. And just as the movement of the gift is 
identified with the movement of life energy throughout society, the circulation of the gift of 
rights strengthens both their legitimacy and the resilience and power of the self. Such power 
invites energy into its system, and the invitation is accepted because it is a more efficient, 
attractive, and satisfying system to belong to: political power achieved on that basis will 
have enduring effects. 
Such a view offers escape from the aridity of rights activism that views rights almost as 
palpable objects that have somehow been taken from their deserving owners. This activism 
cannot be abandoned, of course; it is responsible for saving too many lives. But its victories 
will be defensive and local because it is a concept no longer adequate to the challenge of 
deep systemic change, as it was in the 18th and 19th centuries and in the anti-colonial 
movements of the mid- 20th century. In a sense, the notion of human rights is still resting on 
these laurels. If the contemporary object is objectile, and often unrecognized as such, then 
our presumptions of our relationship to wealth, property, and objects are becoming largely 
delusional, and our notions of rights increasingly irrelevant. 
Freire's work seems especially powerful in this regard, because turns the self back on itself 
and offers the self the chance to negate the assumptions about itself that it holds most dear. 
The pedagogy of the oppressed is a gift in which the pedagog gives up power but not due to 
abnegation of, or embarrassment over, ownership, but as part of a rigorous process in which 
a great obligation is incurred by the receiver of this power, the obligation of self-liberation, 
perhaps self-creation. It is essentialist and connective in the archaic sense of the philotes 
circle and the gift economy, but existential and contemporary in that it fixes the drama of 
self squarely on self-reflexive processes whose purpose is renewal and reassertion of 
connection. 
Conclusion 
We are in the latter stages of a world system that no longer respects the sources of its own 
wealth, including the wealth represented by rights. Our economy can only devour, as if its 
own hollowness can only be filled by every resource the earth has collected for literally 
billions of years. The problem of rights is intrinsically linked to this, the essential problem of 
our time. The degree to which formulations derived from a gift economy can help resolve 
this dilemma depends upon our ability to acknowledge that everyone is gifted, at least in the 
possession of life and consciousness. That this has been interpreted as legitimizing the 
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notion of inalienable, natural rights should not dissuade us from the basic idea that we 
receive a gift of some sort at birth. Cosmology, if nothing else, speaks to the miraculous 
odds against life and consciousness appearing at all, and whether or not one believes in 
miracles, there ought to be no objection to the premise of a gift. But as we have seen, once 
received, the gift must be given again and again in order for it to multiply. Freire's pedagogy 
of the oppressed is one way our verbal and gestural languages can be transformed according 
to the logic of the gift economy. Our challenge in liberating the future from the graven 
templates of the past lies in establishing models whose logic reflects the counter-intuitive 
logic of giftedness. 
The gift, however, is always fraught with danger: the danger of exchange, highly charged 
numinosity, deception, passion, hostility, and even connection. Any new notion of rights will 
have to be ecological as well as liberationist. It will integrate the shadow side of human 
nature in its fullest sense, as it was recognized in myth, and not simply as a function of 
difficult or oppressive economic and political conditions. Somehow, the recognition that self 
is illusory and that thus rights are illusory, must be met in a way that sustains both self and 
rights. The gift economy points the way in this, for in it neither rights nor self can become 
fixed. The illusion of self is sustained by continual giving and renunciation followed by the 
celebratory, festival spirit of renewal. 
Paradoxically, both self and rights perhaps become ultimate objectiles, objects of our 
attention that define the conditions of our attention. In some way, our task is to confront our 
brutality as a species and our inability to cope with the accursed share, the part of ourself that 
is both blessed and that has committed extraordinary crimes to achieve its state of 
blessedness. Can we do this in a way that fosters connection among individuals and between 
individuals and things, while giving us the navigational skills to survive in a highly 
technologized, capitalized world? 
Naturally, one may shy away from - or flat out avoid - suggesting programs to achieve this 
end. I would suggest, however, that we begin to consider our own roles as agents of change 
and supporters of rights in light of the contradictions embedded in our very peculiar and 
dangerous world moment. In any such consideration, the notion of rights must be primary, 
but how we grasp the idea, how we objectify it, will determine whether we continue down a 
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